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Abstract
We examine whether foreign chief executive officers (FCEOs) and foreign
independent board chairpersons (FIBCs) improve on the corporate governance
(CG) practices of emerging market multinational corporations (EMMNCs)
through governance spill over. We use hand-collected data for 80 listed Nige-
rian multinational corporations for the period 2011–2016 (480 firm-years) and
apply a three-stage least squares regression to address endogeneity issues. Our
findings show international exposure of EMMNCs motivate appointment of
FIBCs and FCEOs who positively affect their CG quality. In addition, interna-
tional board interlocks positively moderate the likelihood of FCEOs to export
and enhance EMMNCs' CG quality, but negatively moderate FIBCs impact on
CG practices of EMMNCs. Finally, we develop a framework to show how
EMMNCs' CG practices are exemplary to local firms in the home country who
may mimic these governance practices. We contend the repeated game of gov-
ernance spill-over and mimetic isomorphism drives the evolution of CG insti-
tutions and, potentially, will generate institutional change in CG practices in
emerging markets.
KEYWORD S
Board international interlocks, Corporate governance quality, Emerging market multinational
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In response to the development of corporate governance
(CG) regulatory standards in several developed countries
(Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni, 2016; Khan, Al-Jabri, &
Saif, 2019), many emerging economies have introduced
mandatory or voluntary CG regulatory codes of practice
(Cuomo et al., 2016; Machokoto, Areneke, &
Ibrahim, 2020; Yamori, Harimaya, & Tomimura, 2017).
This propagation of CG codes in emerging markets has
coincided with the emergence of emerging market multi-
national corporations (EMMNCs) with significant opera-
tions in both developed and developing countries. Several
studies have explored the impact of the unique institu-
tional context of emerging economies on firm's outcomes
(Areneke, Yusuf, & Kimani, 2019; Finchelstein, 2017;
Machokoto, Areneke, & Nyangara, 2020; Sarhan, Ntim, &
Al-Najjar, 2019; Tunyi, Agyei-Boapeah, Areneke, &
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Agyemang, 2019; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012;
Yaprak, Yosun, & Cetindamar, 2018). The consensus
within this literature is that, emerging markets are charac-
terized by poor quality regulations, weak regulatory
enforcement, political instability and the presence of cor-
ruption – factors that limit the effectiveness of CG regula-
tion within this environment and, potentially, impact on
the ability of EMMNCs to compete on the global stage
(Bhaumik, Driffield, Gaur, Mickiewicz, & Vaaler, 2019;
Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018).
Similarly, recent studies have explored how multina-
tional firms mitigate and manage institutional tensions
between host and home countries through CG mobility or
spillover (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011; Mil-
etkov, Poulsen, & Wintoki, 2017). For example, Aggarwal
et al. (2011) find that foreign ownership acts as a channel
for the transfer of good CG practices from one country to
another. Similarly, Miletkov et al. (2017) provide evidence
that foreign directors can export good governance prac-
tices into weak institutional environments. Despite this
advancement in the literature, there is a dearth of studies
exploring the role of EMMNCs and their leadership in
promoting (hindering) the development of CG practices in
emerging economies. We contend, due to coercion from
abroad, EMMNCs and their leadership may play a vital
role in enabling the propagation of good CG practices and
strengthening the development of strong regulatory
enforcement mechanisms in emerging markets. We
address this research gap by examining how the interna-
tionalization of firm leadership (CEO and board chairman
positions) contributes to the evolution and development of
resilient governance institutions in EMs through diffusion
of good CG practices from abroad into emerging econo-
mies. In addition, we examine the role of international
board interlocks in shaping the evolution of CG practices
in firms and boardrooms led by non-native directors.
International business literature has shown that com-
pared to single country firms, internationalization
coerces multinational firms to adopt institutional isomor-
phic strategies that enable spillover and adoption of simi-
lar practices across countries (Areneke & Kimani, 2019;
Bhaumik et al., 2019; Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, &
Smith, 2018; Hooghiemstra, 2012). We draw on this liter-
ature (institutional isomorphism) and repeated game the-
ory to uncover how foreign chief executive officers
(FCEOs) and foreign independent board chairpersons
(FIBCs) improve on the governance practices of
EMMNCs in their home country through CG transfers
from abroad.
Following Cumming et al. (2017), we operationalize
CG mobility and isomorphism as the diffusion or transfer
of good CG practices from one country to another. Specifi-
cally, normative pressures from the international
operation of EMMNCs coerces them to adopt good CG
practices in an effort to achieve legitimacy and competi-
tiveness, and to reduce liability of foreignness in their
operations abroad. The pressure to adopt good CG prac-
tices to ensure legitimacy and reduce liability of foreign-
ness may coerce EMMNCs to appoint foreign leaders to
chair boardrooms (FIBCs) and manage firm operations
(FCEOs). This appointments may also enable EMMNCs
to attract foreign investors who may otherwise be discour-
aged by the challenging institutional environment and
negative informal practices in EMs (e.g., corruption).
Foreign leaders (FCEOs and FIBCs), potentially, bring
independence, human capital, experience and exposure to
different governance institutions. They may, therefore,
overcome the institutional void in EMs by reinforcing
compliance with normative (voluntary) CG guidelines in
the EMMNCs home country, which improves the quality
of their governance practices. Furthermore, we conjecture
that the repeated game of transfers through compliance
with CG practices as recommended by regulators in the
EMMNCs home country improves on their governance
quality. The governance isomorphism process, curbs weak
governance enforcement in EMs while reducing the liabil-
ity of foreignness and improvement in cognitive legiti-
macy in foreign host countries. This arguably gives
EMMNCs competitive advantage over their peers, espe-
cially at home. Consequently, due to the high quality of
EMMNCs' governance practices, they may be more suc-
cessful in the home country and a source of emulation by
peer firms. We contend, emulation of EMMNCs' gover-
nance practices by local firms (mimetic isomorphism) in a
repeated game may evolve to more resilient governance
institutions at macro level which may bring about institu-
tional change in CG practices in EMs.
We test our conjecture using mostly hand-collected
data for 80 listed Nigerian MNCs for the period 2011–2016
(480 firm-years). We use compliance with the Nigerian
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) code of good
practices in CG as a measure of the quality of MNC CG
practices. To control for endogeneity, we adopt a three-
stage least square (3SLS) regression approach. Our results
show a significant positive effect of foreign CEOs and
FIBCs on the quality of governance practices of EMMNCs.
Furthermore, while international board interlocks posi-
tively moderate the ability of FCEOs to transfer and pro-
mote good governance practices in firms, it negatively
moderates the likelihood of FIBCs to export and enhance
the governance practices of EMMNCs. Drawing on these
findings, we make several contributions to CG literature.
First, we extend institutional isomorphism and
repeated game literature by developing a conceptual
framework (Figure 1) showing how EMMNCs contribute
to institutional evolution and change by using their
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internationalization of leadership roles to improve on the
quality of CG practices at home. We show that coercion
from abroad enables EMMNCs to continuously improve
on CG practices in line with normative guidelines in the
home country, which may lead to the development of
more resilient governance structures at the firm-level over
time (micro level change). The reputation of EMMNCs as
exemplification of quality CG practices may result to
mimetic isomorphism as peer firms in the home country
imitate their CG practices. Through a repeated game of
mimetic isomorphism, governance practices of firms in
EMs evolve. Thus, leading to the development of more
resilient governance institutions at the macro level, which
can overcome weak regulatory enforcement (institutional
void) at home and may generate institutional change
over time.
Second, we extend the growing literature on CG
mobility. As highlighted earlier, there is growing litera-
ture on the channels through which CG practices are
transferred across economic institutions. However, these
studies have concentrated on foreign directors (as a per-
centage of board composition; Dauth, Pronobis, &
Schmid, 2017), cross-listing (e.g., Areneke &
Kimani, 2019; Temouri, Driffield, & Bhaumik, 2016) and
foreign ownership (Aggarwal et al., 2011) as mechanisms
of governance mobility. Relatively scant attention has
been given to the role foreign leadership of EMMNCs
play in governance mobility despite the fact that, the
positions of CEO and chairperson have been argued to
have powerful influences on the direction and gover-
nance of firms (Clark, Murphy, & Singer, 2014; Coles &
Hesterly, 2000). We address this gap by showing that
FCEO's and FIBCs are important strategic nodes of iso-
morphism between home and host countries CG prac-
tices. Specifically, when EMMNCs employ FCEOs and
FIBCs, these individuals bring diverse experience from
their international exposure, socio-economic, institu-
tional, cultural, business, technical and professional
backgrounds in the leadership of EMMNCs. These attri-
butes provide FCEOs and FIBCs with the necessary skills
and knowledge to impact on the quality of CG practices
in the home country of EMMNCs through exportation of
good governance practices from abroad.
Finally, we highlight the international perspective of
board interlock. The existing research on board interlocks
mainly explores how national interlocks affects gover-
nance behaviour of firms albeit with mixed evidence
(e.g., Fich & White, 2005; Pombo & Gutiérrez, 2011).
However, to our knowledge, there has been no attempt to
examine whether directors who seat on foreign boards
(international interlocks) may impact (moderate) on the
ability of agents of governance mobility to transfer
FIGURE 1 The conceptualization of how emerging market multinational corporations governance quality generates evolution of
governance institutions in emerging markets
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governance practices across countries. We address this
research gap by showing that international board inter-
lock's moderate the ability of FCEOs and FIBCs to export
and improve governance practices of EMMNCs at home.
We show that, when foreign board interlock's increases,
the international exposures of the board enhance FCEOs
ability to influence EMMNCs' CG practices positively. On
the other hand, increase in international interlocks can
lead to director busyness, which may limit their meeting
attendance, and involvement in CG practices of boards.
This may negatively affect the foreign chairpersons' abil-
ity to influence EMMNCs' governance practices as they
may lack support during board decisions because of
absentee directors (including the foreign chairperson
who may be limited by both geographical and outside
board commitments) which reinforces the ability of
CEOs to influence the quality of EMMNCs' governance
practices.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows.
The next section (Section 2), discusses the theoretical and
conceptual framework of the study and testable hypothe-
ses are developed. In Section 3, we present the peculiarity
of the research context (Nigeria) and discussions of
research design. Section 4 present and discuss the find-
ings of the research. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize
and conclude.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Before discussing our main theoretical positions in this
research (i.e., institutional isomorphism and repeated
game perspectives), we note however that, the wider CG
literature stems from a host of complementary theoretical
standpoints (see., Gaur, Kumar, & Singh, 2014; Kumar &
Zattoni, 2015). As such, we invoke such complementary
theoretical lenses including resource dependency, agency
and human capital theories to provide a comprehensive
articulation of our research hypothesis.
2.1 | Institutional isomorphism and
repeated game perspectives
Institutional isomorphism as a strand of institutional the-
ory has received considerable interest in CG scholarship
in recent years (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). Institu-
tional isomorphism theorizes that there are powerful and
diverse institutional influences on firm behaviour
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These institutional forces can
promote or constrain certain activities of the firm. The
consequence of these institutional forces push firms to
adopt similar behaviours within and across economic
environments (Cumming et al., 2017; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Fainshmidt et al., 2018; Gaur et al., 2014).
The similarity in firm behaviour can arise because of
coercion (coercive isomorphism) from formal institutions
(e.g., code of practices of CG instituted by regulators) or
informal traditions and norms. The other two forms of
similarity arise due to pressure from institutionalized
professional bodies (normative isomorphism) and
mimetic isomorphism through imitation of the behaviour
of more successful peer firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola, & Minoja, 2013;
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, &
Lounsbury, 2011).
Repeated game theorizes that the behaviour of eco-
nomic agents (players) occurs repeatedly over time
(Atakan & Ekmekci, 2012; Bohnet & Huck, 2004; Mailath
et al., 2006; Yoon, Guffey, & Kijewski, 1993). The
repeated interaction between economic agents enables
the likelihood of reputation effects whereas dynamic
punishments sustains co-operative behaviours (Bohnet &
Huck, 2004; Mailath et al., 2006; Yoon et al., 1993). For
example, with regards to CG practices of firms, one of the
players are regulators who institute formal governance
laws which firms need to adopt annually (stage game)
and which over time (repeated game) improves the firm's
reputation. On the other hand, are stakeholders (players)
who seek private benefits from firms by encouraging neg-
ative informal practices that limits transparency and
accountability. The latter practices may be detrimental to
firm's adoption of good CG practices over time (repeated
game) but are damaging to the firm's reputation. Specifi-
cally, emerging market firms operate in home countries
with formal and informal unwritten codes of practices
that powerfully impact on their behaviours (Baker, Gib-
bons, & Murphy, 2002). For example, there are often
informal practices (e.g., corruption) and unwritten codes
(e.g., bribery) between firms and the external
environment.
Consequently, both formal governance players
(e.g., CG regulators) and informal governance players
(e.g., corrupt officials and elites) affect the choice of the
firm's governance practices. As a result, firm-level gover-
nance practices reflect the interplay of repeated games
between formal and informal governance practices. The
formal governance regulations encourage firms to adopt
good governance practices, which improve governance
quality and attract investors. However, adoption of these
practices is costly, and weak enforcement further dis-
incentivises their adoption. On the other hand, strong
informal practices such as corruption have a detrimental
and adverse reputational effect on firm governance prac-
tices, but are cheaper alternatives to access critical
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resources especially in EMs where elites and politicians
are private benefit maximizers and gate keepers to
resources. Furthermore, weak enforcement of formal
governance guidelines may reinforce negative informal
practices such as bribery and corruption. For example,
Nakpodia and Adegbite (2018) show institutional void
enforces the ability of elites to invent, circumvent and
corrupt institutions which work against formal regula-
tory initiatives to improve governance practices in EMs.
However, informal governance practices such as corrup-
tion and elitism expose firms to economic, political,
social and environmental cost. Therefore, given the
costs and benefits, the optimal CG practices of firms in
emerging economies can either maintain or change gov-
ernance institutions over time depending on the trade-
off between formal and unethical informal governance
practices.
Drawing on both institutional isomorphism and
repeated game theorizing, we argue that the interna-
tionalization of EMMNCs poses as external coercion
and influence (added player) on firm governance prac-
tices compared to firms operating only in one country.
The international exposure of EMMNCs coerces them to
adopt governance isomorphism strategies that enables
diffusion of good governance practices from abroad to
improve on the home country CG practices. Further-
more, through governance isomorphism, EMMNCs
improve on their cognitive legitimacy abroad; reduce
the liability of foreignness, cultural distance, governance
cost and institutional void at home while simulta-
neously attracting foreign and local capital. Governance
isomorphism reinforces the adoption of recommended
formal CG guidelines in the home country while limit-
ing the problem of weak enforcement by regulators. On
the other hand, bad governance also travels internation-
ally (Allred, Findley, Nielson, & Sharman, 2017;
Cumming et al., 2017). For example, EMMNCs can also
be attracted to countries with poor governance and
weak regulatory oversight to benefit from corrupt
opportunities.
However, we argue that on aggregate, EMMNCs will
trade off unethical informal practices for formal gover-
nance practices that ensure accountability and transpar-
ency, which improves both local and international
reputation of the firm. The repeated game of governance
isomorphism by EMMNCs evolves to robust, resilient
and quality CG practices and makes the governance prac-
tices of these firms reputable and attractive to peer firms
in the home country. This leads to mimetic isomorphism
as peer firms imitate the CG practices of EMMNCs seen
as more successful. The repeated game of mimetic iso-
morphism of governance practices leads to the evolution
of resilient governance institutions that may evolve to
overcome institutional void and generate institutional
change in EMs.
Figure 1 shows our conceptual framework, which
uncovers how EMMNCs bring institutional evolution in
governance practices in EMs through their leadership.
Specifically, internationalization of EMMNCs coerces
them to adopt isomorphic governance practices across
economic environments. This motivates EMMNCs to
appoint FCEOs and FIBCs from host countries especially
those from countries with robust CG guidelines and
enforcement. Foreign independent board chairpersons
(H1) and Foreign CEOs (H2) bring their international
experience, background, knowledge and skills, which
enables them to improve the governance practices of
EMMNCs through governance isomorphism. Isomor-
phism of governance practices through FCEOs and
FIBCs is moderated by the level of directors interlock/
affiliation with boardrooms in other countries (H3 and
H4). The repeated game of improvement of EMMNCs'
CG practices through governance isomorphism (H1–H4),
generates more resilient CG practices at home. Mimick-
ing of EMMNCs' CG practices (right-hand side of the fig-
ure) by peer firms leads to improvement in the latter's
CG practices. The repeated game of imitation by peer
firms and governance isomorphism by EMMNCs evolves
to macro-level institutional change in governance prac-
tices in EMs (see extreme right of Figure 1). Drawing on
the conceptual framework (Figure 1), we develop four
testable hypotheses.
2.2 | Chairperson foreignness and the
quality of CG practices
Board leadership debate is generally discussed across two
streams of literature. On the one hand, drawing from
agency theory, research on board leadership indepen-
dence argues that the separation of chairman and CEO
positions leads to a balance of power which limits insider
dominance (e.g., see Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996;
Kula, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Pearce &
Zahra, 1991). These studies mainly argue that the separa-
tion of the positions of CEO and chairperson is a more
effective measure of monitoring and control. Specifically,
when there is CEO-chairman duality, the board's ability
to monitor and control management decreases that, con-
sequently, leads to a lack of independence and agency
conflict. This negatively affects firm CG practices and
shareholders' value maximization.
On the other hand, organisational leadership and
strategic management literature offer insights on how the
backgrounds, skills', leadership styles and experience of
CEOs and board chairpersons can affect firm outcomes.
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Specifically, this literature argues that the presence or
absence of certain leadership characteristics influences
organizational direction, governance and performance
(Fitzsimmons & Callan, 2016; Puffer & Weintrop, 1995;
Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011). For example,
Clark et al. (2014) contend that different governance and
ownership structures enhance (or limit) the ability of cor-
porate leaders to improve financial performance. Simi-
larly, Fitzsimmons and Callan (2016) find that CEOs'
social capital and industry-specific knowledge are traits
sought after by boards when seeking to appoint
new CEOs.
Existing studies have, however, overlooked how the
interface between leadership independence and leader-
ship human capital integrates with the international per-
spective of firms in promoting institutional isomorphism
practices. We attempt to close this lacuna with insights
from international business research. Specifically, recent
international business research has shown that in the
process of governance mobility, MNCs can impact on
home country governance practices through interna-
tional governance agents including board of directors
with different nationalities, foreign ownership and cross-
listing (e.g., see Cumming et al., 2017; Dauth et al., 2017;
Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-Helmhout, & Makhija, 2017;
Hooghiemstra, Hermes, Oxelheim, & Randøy, 2019; Mil-
etkov et al., 2017). For example, Miletkov et al. (2017)
report that multinational directors improve the gover-
nance disclosure quality of firms. Similarly, Temouri
et al. (2016) show that dual listing improves firm-level
governance quality through bonding. Despite these
recent contributions, whether the foreignness of
EMMNCs leadership improve on their CG quality at
home remains a theoretical and empirical gap.
We use insights from leadership independence,
human capital and governance mobility literature to
close this research gap by examining how foreign leader-
ship of firms through the positions of CEOs and chairper-
sons enhance EMMNCs' governance quality at home.
Specifically, we explore the interface between the three
streams of literature by showing that the inter-
nationalisation of EMMNCs encourages them to develop
institutional isomorphism practices across economic
institutions. This is particularly relevant in EMs where
isomorphism can reduce liability of foreignness and
improve cognitive legitimacy abroad while overcoming
the weaknesses in the home country especially institu-
tional void. Specifically, compared to local firms, interna-
tionalization of EMMNCs pushes them to appoint FCEOs
and FIBCs to lead the firm. These foreigners bring with
them diverse human capital due to their heterogeneous
origins, which they employ to enhance the quality of CG
practices in the home country.
We argue that independent foreign chairpersons
occupy a strategic position, which enables them to influ-
ence boardroom behavior of EMMNCs in adopting good
CG practices. Extant literature shows the separation of
CEO and chairman positions enhance the firm's gover-
nance practices (Kula, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). In
this light, many EMs have developed codes that empha-
size separation of these leadership positions to ensure
board independence. For example, the Nigerian Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (2011) prescribes the sep-
aration of leadership position. It is therefore unsurprising
that most Nigerian firms (presented later) have separated
their leadership positions.
We contend that foreign leadership of a separated
CEO and chairperson position in EMs offer additional
perspective on leadership independence. This is because
foreigners are less likely to collude with locals to extract
private benefits, which have been shown to be actively
promoted by local elites. For example, recent evidence
from Nakpodia and Adegbite (2018) show that due to the
motivation to gain private benefits, elites in Nigeria cre-
ate, evade and corrupt governance institutions. We,
therefore, argue that foreign independent chairpersons
(FIBCs) are an additional monitoring mechanism as their
absence from the home country may help them overcome
unethical CG practices compared to local chairpersons
who are likely to be influenced by negative informal
practices. Furthermore, existing literature suggests MNCs
appoint foreign directors to increase governance isomor-
phism strategy through exportation of good governance
guidelines and enforcement from host countries to EMs
with weak governance enforcement. We contend, due to
the international exposure of foreign chairpersons, they
are more likely to understand and manage governance
complexities and as such are better placed to promote
EMMNCs' governance isomorphism objectives across
economic environments.
Similarly, the extant literature (e.g., Oxelheim,
Gregori, Randøy, & Thomsen, 2013) suggests directors
from Anglo-American institutions improve CG disclo-
sures quality. We propose that the recruitment of a for-
eign chairperson from countries with Anglo-American
systems with robust CG enforcement (e.g., USA and UK)
will enhance their ability to manage and improve board-
room efficiency. Therefore, they can reduce home coun-
try institutional weaknesses while simultaneously
improve EMMNC's compliance with formal governance
guidelines, which curbs the influence of antithetical gov-
ernance practices.
More so, foreign chairpersons bring their human cap-
ital from their international experience to manage board
processes and robust monitoring. Therefore, they can
harness their socioeconomic diversity, varied institutional
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knowledge, professional, political, cultural and business
backgrounds to enhance EMMNCs' governance practices.
More so, host and home country experiences provides
foreign chairpersons with ‘first-hand’ knowledge of
global markets (Hahn & Lasfer, 2016; Masulis, Wang, &
Xie, 2012) which they can harness to reduce firms liabil-
ity of foreignness and improves legitimacy abroad while
transferring good CG practices from other economic envi-
ronments to enhance the quality of EMMNCs' CG prac-
tices at home. We contend that, the continual exportation
of good governance practices by EMMNCs in the process
of governance isomorphism through FIBCs improves the
firm's competitiveness, visibility and success. Over time,
this encourages peer firms in the home country to copy
the CG practices of EMMNCs. In a repeated game of imi-
tation of EMMNCs' CG practices (memetic isomorphism),
peer firms in the home country develop resilient and more
robust CG practices that are capable of bypassing negative
informal practices (e.g., corruption) and weak regulatory
enforcement of formal governance guidelines. Therefore,
the evolution of EMMNCs' CG practices through gover-
nance isomorphism channelled by foreign chairpersons in
addition to peer firm mimetic isomorphic practices may
generate institutional change in governance practices in
the home country (from left to right of Figure 1 through
H1). We, therefore, hypothesize that
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between
the presence of FIBCs and EMMNCs governance
quality.
2.3 | CEO foreignness and the quality of
CG practices
Like FIBCs, when foreign CEOs move to the home coun-
tries of EMMNCs, they carry along their human capital,
resources, skills, knowledge and experience of other gover-
nance systems, which they employ in the day-to-day gov-
ernance of the firm. As such, they can tap on their rich
backgrounds and knowledge of different governance insti-
tutions to improve on the CG practices of EMMNCs at
home in the process of governance isomorphism. Using
board independence as an example, the Nigerian Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (2011) governance code
requires firms to have only one independent board mem-
ber. Therefore, CEOs from South African or the UK with
governance codes (King III report and UK 2010 and 2016
-Combine Codes respectively) that emphasis majority of
the board to be independent are likely to transfer similar
practices to Nigerian MNCs. This may lead to Nigerian
MNCs meeting the Nigerian Securities and Exchange
Commission (2011) governance requirement for board
independence in addition to having more independent
directors above the threshold required.
More so, the extant literature suggests foreigners are
less likely to engage in unethical practices such as bribery
and corruption, which is prevalent in EMs (Areneke &
Kimani, 2019; Miletkov et al., 2017). Therefore, FCEOs
are less likely to involve in corruption and elitism prac-
tices that can compromise their ability to adopt good CG
practices and as such, can monitor the implementation of
recommended CG practices than local CEOs. Further-
more, human capital literature (e.g., Clark et al., 2014;
Fitzsimmons & Callan, 2016) suggest that CEOs bring
their experience and knowledge from different firms and
across different institutions to impact on the firm's gover-
nance practices. Therefore, FCEOs experience of gover-
nance institutions from their countries of origin and
other host countries makes them more likely to reduce
uncertainties and information asymmetry by diffusing
good governance practices from abroad to improve on
EMMNCs' governance quality. For example, compared to
local CEO's, CEOs from the United States and the United
Kingdom with more robust CG enforcement are likely to
encourage transparency and accountability through the
exportation of CG practices from their home country to
improve on CG practices of Nigerian MNCs. More so,
FCEOs are more likely to ensure the implementation of
good CG practices that can overcome weak enforcement
in the home country compared to local CEO's. Hence,
FCEOs are more suited to promote EMMNCs adoption of
formal governance guidelines rather than negative infor-
mal institutional practices (e.g., bribery and corruption).
We contend that continuous improvement of
EMMNCs' CG practices through governance isomor-
phism by FCEOs in a repeated game curb unethical
informal practice and generates a culture of good CG
practices over time. The enhancement of EMMNCs' CG
practices by FCEOs may improve their competitiveness
and success at home and abroad in addition to building
their reputation as successful examples in the home
country. This may encourage peer firms to mimic and
adopt their CG practices (from left to right of Figure 1 via
H2). We therefore hypothesize that
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between
the presence of FCEOs and EMMNCs' governance
quality.
2.4 | Moderating role of board
international interlocks
Resource dependency theory argues that boards of direc-
tors are an essential strategic resource for the firm in
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relation to its external resource needs. These linkages
include networks with or affiliations to business elites,
competitors, banks, as well as market and industry intel-
ligence (Pfeffer, 1973). Therefore, firms appoint directors
to their board to tap into the resources they bring from
their external linkages. However, there is mixed evidence
on whether board interlock with external environments
improves on firm outcomes. For example, Falato,
Kadyrzhanova, and Lel (2014) report that board interlock
increases board busyness which is detrimental to moni-
toring quality and shareholder value. In contrast, Cai,
Dhaliwal, Kim, and Pan (2014) report a positive effect of
board interlock on information sharing and firm disclo-
sure policies. Nevertheless, the impact of international
board interlocks on firm practices is relatively unexplored
in the prior literature. Due to mixed evidence and the
lack of research thereof, we explore whether the interna-
tional linkages of boardrooms affect the ability of agents
of CG mobility to impact on EMMNCs' governance
practices.
We argue that interlock with international board-
rooms may affect the diffusion of CG practices from one
country to another. Specifically, when directors seat in
boardrooms in other countries, they bond with interna-
tional CG practices which they can export to the home
country to improve on EMMNCs' CG practices. More so,
EMMNCs may appoint directors who seat on boardrooms
out of the home country to benefit from their resource
links in the host country as well as the director's ability
to influence adoption of international CG practices. On
the other hand, international interlocks can increase
director's busyness and negatively affect their ability to
attend board meetings and improve on firm CG practices.
For example, the findings of Masulis et al. (2012) suggest
that board busyness especially busy foreign directors
impact negatively on board meetings attendance. This
suggests that board interlock in foreign countries might
be detrimental to board monitoring and, consequently,
EMMNCs' governance quality.
We contend that for FIBCs to effectively monitor
implementation and diffusion of good CG practices in the
home country of EMMNCs, they need other board mem-
bers especially those with international interlocks to sup-
port adoption of isomorphic governance practices.
However, given that such directors may be busy with
boardroom commitments in other countries, this may
limit their ability to attend board meetings. Hence, the
likelihood of FIBCs to affect the CG quality of EMMNCs
diminishes. This effect may be more severe when there is
a self-serving native CEO who may benefit from the
director's absenteeism to influence unethical governance
practices such as corruption and elitism. On the other
hand, in cases where directors who seat on foreign
boardrooms attend board meetings, they can assist FIBCs
to improve and diffuse CG practices in the home country
of EMMNCs. Therefore, board international interlocks
may have either a negative or positive moderating effect
on the ability of FIBCs to impact on EMMNCs' gover-
nance quality which reduces (improves) the likelihood of
governance isomorphism (see H3 on Figure 1). We there-
fore hypothesis
H3: Ceteris paribus, international board interlocks nega-
tively (positively) moderate the association between
FIBCs and EMMNCs' governance quality.
On the other hand, because FCEOs are present in the
home country as they are involved in the daily gover-
nance of the firm, they are more likely to have more
influence on EMMNCs' governance practices even in sit-
uations where directors are absent because of board com-
mitment in other countries. Similarly, when directors
who seat on foreign boards attend meetings, they collabo-
rate with FCEOs to improve on EMMNCs' governance
quality in the process of governance isomorphism. There-
fore, cross-national interlock can positively influence the
FCEOs ability to diffuse and improve governance quality
of EMMNCs (shown in H4 on Figure 1). Hence, we
hypothesis
H4: Ceteris paribus, international board interlocks posi-
tively moderate the association between FCEOs and
EMMNCs' governance quality.
3 | RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Context
Nigeria presents a rich institutional context for our study
for several reasons. Recent World Bank statistics suggest
that Nigeria is currently Africa's (and the World's 28th)
largest economy with GDP (in 2017) of over $400 billion
(Lange, Wodon, & Carey, 2018). It is also Africa's (and
the World's 11th) largest oil producing nation. Nonethe-
less, the economy is reasonably well diversified. For
example, despite its oil production pedigree, it only
accounts for about 9% of the GDP as the country also
boasts thriving services (55% of GDP), industrial (26% of
GDP) and agricultural (18% of GDP) sectors (Lange
et al., 2018). This makes Nigeria an attractive destination
of foreign direct investment but also allows for the devel-
opment of enterprises, which can compete on a global
scale, that is, MNCs. Importantly, Nigeria bears the hall-
marks of the typical EM, particularly in terms of high
family control, concentrated ownership, weak national
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institutions and the prevalence of corruption and fraud
(Adegbite, 2015).
To bolster its economic potential, international pres-
sures from organisations such as the IMF and World
Bank in the last few decades prompted the country to
take on a programme of deregulation and economic liber-
alization (Ahunwan, 2002; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018;
Nakpodia, Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Owolabi, 2018). Propo-
nents of these changes argue the potential for accelerat-
ing economic growth, development and alleviating
poverty and corruption by enhancing responsible CG
practices that are align to international standards
(Adegbite, 2015; Ahunwan, 2002). As a result, the Nige-
rian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
developed CG guidelines (including, SEC 2003 and 2011
CG codes) providing recommendations for best practice
of CG to be implemented by firms listed on the Nigeria
Stock Exchange.
However, it is worth emphasizing that Nigeria is also
a melting pot of over 500 different ethnic groups and con-
sequently, diverse (and occasionally antagonistic) reli-
gious and cultural beliefs (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018).
Hence, the Nigeria SEC 2011 CG code emphasizes sensi-
tivity to social and cultural diversity while also aligning
with western CG systems. As discussed in Areneke and
Kimani (2019), the United Kingdom and South Africa are
preferred destinations for several Nigerian firms seeking
cross-listing or cross-border expansion, perhaps,
explaining the similarities between the CG codes of the
three countries. It is in this context that this article
explores the role of foreign leaders, specifically FCEOs
and FIBCs, in shaping CG quality and practices within
EMMNCs.
3.2 | Data sources and sample
Our sample covers multinational corporations listed on
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSX) between 2011 and
2016. To identify multinational firms, we manually scan
through financial reports of all listed firms to identify
firms that report foreign operations. Due to the
unavailability of the required CG data (especially country
level CG disclosure data) for Nigerian firms in most data-
bases (e.g., DataStream, Orbis, Boardex), we manually
collect CG data from the annual reports of our sampled
MNCs. We then collect financial (income statement and
balance sheet) data for these firms from Thomson
Reuters DataStream. We encounter problems with miss-
ing financial data, which we address by hand-collecting
additional financial statement data. We then create our
panel dataset by manually matching the data from
DataStream to the hand-collected CG data using firm
names and year. To be included in our final sample, firms
must have complete annual reports covering the period
of the study (2011–2016). Our final sample consists of
80 unique multinational firms and a total of 480 firm-
year observations.
We focus on the 2011–2016 period for two reasons.
Firstly, the SEC 2011 CG code became effective from the
2011 financial year, hence we measure CG quality using
this guidelines for the post compliance period. Secondly,
we limit our last year to 2016 because the Nigerian SEC
introduced a draft revision of the 2011 CG guidelines in
2017. Therefore, to ensure consistency and avoid new
and or future regulatory influences (e.g., changes in some
CG provisions and applicability), we limit our last sample
year to 2016. In other words, our choice of sample period
is to ensure relevance and validity of measurement of CG
quality to ensure consistency with SEC 2011 CG code.
We also included financial firms in our sample for
two reasons. Firstly, these firms constitute more than
25% of listed firms in NSX and therefore represent a large
section of the corporate sector in Nigeria. Secondly, com-
pared to firms from other industries, financial firms in
Nigeria have shown evidence of unethical practices in
the past (Areneke & Kimani, 2019). For instance, top
management teams of several Nigerian banks were
imprisoned due to corruption and nepotism practices
including allocating loans to their tribesmen, friends, rel-
atives and themselves (Areneke & Kimani, 2019). To
ensure that this choice does not bias our results, in our
robustness checks, we exclude financial firms from our
analyses. Additionally, in our analyses, we control for
industry effects. As we will discuss later, all our results
are robust to this choice. Table 1 summarizes our sample
composition by industry. Overall, our sampled MNCs
constitute 45% of firms listed on the NSX at the end of
year December 2016.
3.3 | Variables
3.3.1 | Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is corporate governance quality
(CGQ) which is measured as a firm's total compliance to
the 75 governance provisions required by the Nigerian
Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) CG code. In
contrast with CG codes in other countries with some pro-
visions applicable to premium or large listed firms only
(e.g., 2016 and 2018 UK Corporate Governance codes), all
the provisions of the Nigeria SEC 2011 CG code are appli-
cable to all firms listed on the NSX irrespective of size or
industry. In line with prior research (e.g., Gyapong &
Afrifa, 2019; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012), each
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provision is measured as a dichotomous score of one or
zero. The final CGQ score is a continuous variable that
ranges from 0% up to 100% (full compliance with all the
provisions of the SEC code). For example, a firm that
adopts 51 of the 75 provisions in a year has a score
of 68%.
3.3.2 | Explanatory and moderating
variables
Our first explanatory variable is FIBCs measured as a
dichotomous variable, which takes the value of one if the
board chairman is a non-executive director and non-
native of the firm's home country (non-Nigerian), and a
value of zero, otherwise. Similarly, we measure FCEOs as
a binary variable with the value of one when the CEO is
not a native of the home country (Nigeria), and a value of
zero, otherwise. Our moderating variable, board interna-
tional interlock (BII), is measured following prior
research (e.g Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006; Stuart &
Yim, 2010) as the number of board seats occupied by
directors out of the firm's home country.
3.3.3 | Control variables
Prior literature (e.g., Hooghiemstra, 2012; Ruigrok
et al., 2006) suggest that several CG variables impact
on governance quality. Hence, our analyses controls
for such influences. First, research
(e.g., Boulouta, 2013; Cai et al., 2014) suggests that,
due to the ethical behavior and diversity of ideas
brought into boardrooms by female directors, they
improve on board decision-making and firm CG prac-
tices. Hence, we control for boardroom gender diver-
sity using the percentage of women on the board (GD).
Independent boards are more likely to scrutinize firm
compliance with CG regulations than insider domi-
nated boards (Cornett, McNutt, & Tehranian, 2009;
Khan, Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 2013). This suggest that
boards with high proportion of non-executive directors
(NED) are likely to have enhanced CG quality. We
control for board independence using the percentage
of NEDs to the total board size and proportion of inde-
pendent directors in the audit committee (ACI). Fur-
thermore, the separation of CEO and Chairman
position (CEO duality) has been argued as necessary
for effectiveness of CG practices (Fitzsimmons &
Callan, 2016; Tian et al., 2011). Specifically, when the
position of CEO and chairman is separated, there is
enhanced monitoring and control which leads to
improvement in CG quality. Hence, we control for
CEO duality (DL) using a dummy variable which takes
a value of one if there is separation of CEO and chair-
man positions and a value of zero, otherwise.
The presence of institutional shareholders ensures
stronger incentive to monitor CG practices than do indi-
vidual investors as they have larger stakes in the firm
(Chung & Zhang, 2011). This suggests that the presence
of institutional investors reduces information asymmetry
and improves CG quality. We control for institutional
shareholding (ISH), defined as the proportion of shares
held by banks, mutual funds and insurance company's to
the total value of shares. More so, firm performance has
been shown to affect firm's ability to adopt recommended
CG practices as compliance to guidelines require signifi-
cant expenditure (Gaur et al., 2014; Westphal, Seidel, &
Stewart, 2001). We thus control for firm performance
using return on asset (ROA) and Tobin Q (Q). Further-
more, large and fast growing firms are more likely to
have adequate resources to enable compliance with CG
regulations than their smaller and low-growth counter-
parts (Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013). Hence, we control
for size and growth influences using capital expenditure
as a percentage of the total asset (CAP) and sales growth
(SG). Lastly, we also control for industry and year effects
using six industry and year dummies respectively. Defini-
tions and measurements of variables are presented in
Table 2. To avoid the effect of extreme values, all
TABLE 1 Industrial classification of sampled firms
Industrial composition Number of firms per industry Firms sampled Proportion of listing (%)
Agriculture/consumer goods 33 16 9
Consumer services/health care 34 12 6
Financials 57 31 17
ICT/real estate 18 6 4
Industrials/conglomerates 27 6 4
Natural resources/oil and gas 19 9 5
Total population 188 80 45
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continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 99th
percentiles.
3.3.4 | Estimation methods
Prior evidence (e.g Roberts & Whited, 2013; Schultz, Tan, &
Walsh, 2010; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012) suggests that
endogeneity is a serious issue that can affect inferences from
research of this nature. To ensure our results are not biased to
endogeneity, we employ a three-stage least square (3SLS) esti-
mation method that has been evidenced to control for endo-
geneity (e.g Denis & Sibilkov, 2010; Estélyi & Nisar, 2016).
Before conducting a 3SLS estimation, we use the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman homogeneity test (see Larcker & Rusticus, 2010, for
detailed discussions on how to implement instrumental vari-
able models) to examine whether there is a simultaneous link
between our dependent and independent variables. The find-
ings reject the null of no endogeneity, suggesting that foreign
leadership and MNC CG quality are endogenously related.
This suggests that OLS may produce bias estimates and there-
fore 3SLS is a more suitable estimation method. However, for
robustness, we also present results from the standard OLS esti-
mation. Our 3SLS estimation equations are stated as;
CGQit = β0 + β1FIBCit + β2FCEOit + β3GDit + β4ACI it
+ β5ISH it + β6ROAit + β7Qit + β8SGit−1 + β9CAPit
+ β10DLit + β11NEDit + β12BII it + vj + vt + ϵit
ð1Þ
CGQit = β0 + β1FIBCit + β2FCEOit + β3GDit + β4ACI it
+ β5ISH it + β6ROAit + β7Qit + β8SGit−1 + β9CAPit
+ β10DLit + β11NEDit + β12BII it + β13FIBC*BII it
+ β14FCEO*BII it + vj + vt + ϵit
ð2Þ
In Equation 1, CGQ is predicted by foreign indepen-
dent board chairmanship (FIBC), foreign CEO (FCEO) in
TABLE 2 Definition of variables and measurements
Variables (Abbrev.) Definition
Panel A: Dependent variable
Corporate governance quality
(CGQ)
A continuous variable that ranges from 0% up to 100% based on 75 CG provisions of the Nigeria
SEC 2011 CG code.




Dichotomous variable which takes the value of one if the board is chaired by a non-executive
director who is a non-Nigerian and a value of zero, otherwise.
Foreign chief executive officer
(FCEO)
Dichotomous variable which takes the value of one if the CEO is a non-Nigerian director and a
value of zero, otherwise.
Board international interlock
(BII)
Number of boards seats occupied by directors out of the firm's home country.
Panel C: Control variables
Gender diversity (GD) Female directors as a percentage of number of board members.
CEO duality (DL) A dummy variable one, if there is separation of CEO and chairman positions and a value of zero,
otherwise.
Non-executive directors (NED) Non-executive directors (NED) as a percentage of board size.
Institutional shareholding (ISH) Percentage of institutional shareholding to the total shares of a firm.
Audit committee independence
(ACI)
Non-executive directors as a percentage of number of audit committee members.
Return on asset (ROA) Earnings for the year as a percentage of total asset.
Tobin q (Q) Ratio of total assets minus equity book value plus market value of equity to total assets.
Capital expenditure (CAP) Capital expenditure as a percentage of firm total assets.
Sales growth (SG) The difference between current and previous year sales revenue as a percentage of previous year
sales revenue.
Industry dummies (IND) Dummy for each industry group (total of six industry dummies).
Year dummies (YD) Dummy for each of the six firm years.
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TABLE 3 Descriptive and correlation statistics
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. CGQ 73.72 17.12 0.08* 0.10** 0.43*** 0.27*** 0.01 0.10** 0.20*** 0.09* −0.02 0.14*** 0.00 0.40***
2. FIBC 0.28 0.45 0.10** 0.36*** −0.06 −0.16*** 0.42*** 0.26*** 0.28*** −0.08* 0.36*** −0.22*** 0.12*** 0.12***
3. FCEO 0.11 0.31 0.11** 0.36*** 0.02 −0.07 0.15*** 0.07 0.22*** −0.01 0.17*** −0.20*** 0.08* 0.10***
4. GD 13.76 11.49 0.41*** −0.06 0.02 0.03 −0.11** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.00 −0.03 −0.20*** 0.21***
5. ACI 89.94 16.91 0.35*** −0.05 −0.01 0.11** −0.13*** −0.03 −0.06 0.05 0.05 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.17***
6. ISH 52.61 23.23 −0.03 0.40*** 0.14*** −0.14*** −0.18*** 0.14*** 0.30*** −0.08* 0.16*** −0.08* 0.17*** 0.17***
7. ROA 3.6 12.95 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.14** −0.04 0.08* 0.22*** 0.03 0.44*** −0.12*** 0.06 0.08*
8. Q 1.47 1.74 0.11** 0.15*** 0.01 0.13*** −0.12*** 0.21*** 0.30*** −0.01 0.25*** −0.05 −0.03 0.08*
9. SG 10.01 19.99 0.04 −0.04 0.01 0.14*** 0 −0.04 0.15*** −0.01 −0.08* 0 −0.05 0.04
10. CAP 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.19*** 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.08* 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.01 −0.09* 0.11*** 0.10***
11. DL 0.98 0.14 0.13*** −0.22*** −0.20*** −0.02 0.16*** −0.08* −0.06 0.01 0 −0.02 0.16*** 0.01
12. NED 71.63 12.67 0.07 0.11** 0.07 −0.18*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 0 −0.03 −0.02 −0.04 0.17*** 0.11***
13. BII 1.08 2.56 0.20*** 0.10** 0.10** 0.14*** 0.10** 0.07 0.04 0.01 −0.01 0 −0.01 0.03
Note: Spearman correlation coefficients are reported at the top right corner of the table and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported at the bottom left corner of the table. Full variable def-


















addition to the moderating variable (BII) and 11 control
variables, including gender diversity, audit committee
independence, institutional shareholding, Return on
Asset (ROA), Tobin Q (Q), sales growth (SG), capital
expenditure (CAP), CEO duality (DL), proportion of
NEDs (NED), industry dummies (IND) and year
dummies (YD). Equation (2) re-examines Equation (1)
but with the addition of interaction effects between
FIBCs and international interlock (FBC*BII) and the lat-
ter with FCEOs (FCEO*BII).
To conduct 3SLS, we need instruments that meet both
the sufficiency and validity conditions. Institutional the-
ory suggests that, the institutional environment influ-
ences the behaviour of economic actors (Cumming
et al., 2017; Dauth et al., 2017). This implies the behav-
iours of foreign chairpersons and CEOs are influenced by
the institutional peculiarities of corporate practices in
their countries of origin including corporate ethics and
accountability. Corporate ethics and the level of account-
ability of FCEOs and FIBCs countries of origin is col-
lected from the World Economic Forum Global
Competitive Index datasets. In untabulated correlations,
we find that corporate ethics and accountability in the
country of origin are highly correlated with FIBCs (coeffi-
cients of 0.96 and 0.98 respectively). Similarly, the coun-
try of origin corporate ethics and accountability are
strongly correlated with FCEOs (coefficients of 0.97 and
0.98 respectively). These suggest the instruments meet
the sufficiency condition. Furthermore, these instru-
ments are uncorrelation with the error terms on the sec-
ond stage, which implies they meet the validity
condition. More so, we also conducted the Hanson-
Sargan test of over-identification, and the p-values are
above 0.32 suggesting the instruments meet the exclusion
condition, which also confirms the instruments are
exogenous.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics and
correlation diagnostics
The descriptive and correlation statistics are reported in
Table 3. The average CGQ of the sampled MNCs is
73.70% suggesting that on aggregate, firms are adopting
recommended CG practices. This is comparable but mod-
erately higher to CG quality of 71.33% reported by Ntim
et al. (2013) for King II CG compliance level but signifi-
cantly higher than the 61.44% compliance to King III
guidelines recently reported by Gyapong and Afrifa (2019)
for South African firms. However, while some firms com-
ply with up to 100% of the governance guidelines, others
comply with about a quarter of the guidelines. Also, there
is high variability between firm-level CG qual-
ity (17.12%).
Foreign CEOs manage approximately 28% of the
sampled MNCs. Regarding board leadership, about 11%
of boards are led by foreign chairpersons. More so, on
average, the sampled MNCs have at least one interlock
with boards in a foreign country. These results compares
favourably against results from other contexts. Specifi-
cally, our sample firms report significantly higher levels
of average director foreignness compared to firms in
China, Kenya, India, Mexico, Brazil South Africa and
Zimbabwe (Estélyi & Nisar, 2016). Indeed, besides the
USA, our results when assessed against the 30 countries
(both developed and developing nations) examined in
Estélyi and Nisar (2016), suggest that Nigerian MNCs
are among the highest in promoting appointment of for-
eign leaders to manage their operations and
boardrooms.
The control variables also show high variability. For
example, the average of NEDs is 71.63% with variability
of 12.66%. This is significantly higher than that reported
for Nigeria (21%) by Ehikioya (2009) for the period
1998–2002. Similarly, 98% of the firms have separated the
CEO and chairperson positions with a variability of
13.5%. This also indicates that separation of leadership
position has improved from 91% between the 1998 and
2002 period (see details in Ehikioya, 2009, p. 236). Over-
all, these descriptive statistics suggest that the various
Nigeria SEC CG codes have improved CG standards in
listed Nigeria firms over time. Finally, on average, ROA
is 3.6 with a standard deviation of 12.95.
Correlation results are presented in Columns 4–16 on
Table 3. The pairwise correlations are generally low to
moderate (with a maximum of 0.44), suggesting that
multicollinearity is not a major concern in our subse-
quent estimations. For additional robustness, we exam-
ined the variance inflator factor for each of our equations
and the highest is 2.59, which is below the critical value
of 10. We also examine Cook disturbance and tolerance
statistics (not reported for brevity reasons), and they all
assuage multicollinearity concerns. Interesting, CG qual-
ity is significantly associated with both FIBCs and
FCEOs, which provides early indications in support of
our main hypotheses.
4.2 | Main results and discussion
Table 4 presents results from our hypotheses tests. In
Model 1, we examine H1 and H2. In Model 2, we add the
moderating effect of international interlocks to assess H3
and H4. Our main estimation method results (3SLS) are
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reported in Columns 2 and 3, and OLS results are
reported in Columns 4 and 5.
First, we hypothesis (H1) that, FIBCs will impact on
the governance practices of EMMNCs. As shown in
Table 4 for both 3SLS and OLS, the results are significant
and consistent with H1 suggesting that FIBCs positively
impact on EMMNCs' governance quality. In terms of eco-
nomic significance, the appointment of a foreign board
TABLE 4 Board chairperson and CEO foreignness and CG quality association
Variables
3SLS estimation Pooled OLS estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Foreign independent chairman (FIBC) 5.86*** 11.31*** 5.57*** 10.30***
(1.99) (2.26) (1.36) (1.69)
Foreign CEO (FCEO) 7.58*** 4.15** 7.08*** 4.54**
(1.64) (1.93) (1.67) (1.99)
Gender diversity (GD) 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.400***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Audit committee independence (ACI) 0.31*** 0.300*** 0.32*** 0.31***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Institutional shareholding (ISH) 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03)
ROA 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.18***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Tobin q (Q) 1.17*** 1.24*** 1.32*** 1.40***
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Sales growth (SG) −0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Capital expenditure (CAP) 3.85 5.15 4.72*** 5.52***
(3.33) (3.25) (1.81) (1.88)
CEO duality (DL) 16.22*** 15.36*** 15.36*** 15.50***
(4.54) (4.42) (4.42) (4.54)
Proportion of NEDs (NED) −0.04 −0.04 −0.02 −0.026
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Board international interlocks (BII) 0.74*** 1.35*** 0.76* 1.39**
(0.23) (0.35) (0.40) (0.59)
FIBC*BII — −4.33*** — −3.77***
— (0.96) — (0.78)
FCEO*BII — 2.98*** — 2.47**
— (0.97) — (0.96)
Constant 19.93*** 21.99*** 13.83** 14.36**
(6.07) (5.94) (5.74) (5.87)
N 480 480 480 480
R-squared 0.484 0.502 0.499 0.519
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table explores the impact of chairperson and CEO foreignness on CGQ quality and the moderating role of international interlocks.
***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Robust mean square standard errors (RMSE) are in parentheses. CGQ is an
index of firm compliance with the 75 provisions recommended by Nigeria SEC 2011 CG code. Full variable definitions are available in
Table 2.
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chairman is associated with approximately 5.8% improve-
ment in the CG quality of EMMNCs. Thus, the results
support our argument that in the process of governance
isomorphism, FIBCs utilize their knowledge of varied
governance institutions including different cultural and
business backgrounds to enhance the CG practices of
EMMNCs which may evolve overtime to resilient gover-
nance practices and a source of mimicking for other
firms. The finding is consistent with recent advances in
CG research by Estélyi and Nisar (2016); Miletkov
et al. (2017) who also evidenced that foreign directors
improve on the CG practices and corporate outcomes of
firms especially in countries with weak governance
enforcement.
Similar to FIBCs, in the second hypothesis (H2), we
propose that foreign CEOs (FCEOs) will positively influ-
ence the CG quality of EMMNCs. The results from
Table 4 supports this conjecture that FCEOs enhance
MNCs governance quality at home, which may evolve to
more resilient CG practices and become a source of imi-
tation by peer firms. Specifically, the appointment of
FCEOs improves CG quality of EMMNCs by approxi-
mately 7.58%. This result is consistent with the recent
findings of Chuah and Foong (2019) that FCEOs improve
corporate outcomes but contrast the result of Vo,
Nguyen, Tuan, Luu, & Vu (2020) that foreign CEOs
under-perform in countries with good governance
supporting institutions. Nonetheless, our finding indi-
cates that non-native CEOs improve the CG quality of
EMMNCs due to their experience and knowledge from
different governance institutions. We contend that, the
experiences and knowledge of governance institutions
from their home country and other host countries
increases the likelihood of transparency and diffusing
good governance practices internationally to improve on
MNCs governance quality in weak regulatory
environments.
Furthermore, in the third hypothesis (H3), we sug-
gest that interlocks with foreign boards moderate the
impact of FIBCs on EMMNCs governance quality. Con-
sistent with our prediction of H3, the coefficient of the
interaction between foreign board chairs and interna-
tional interlocks (FIBC*BII) is significantly and negative
in both 3SLS (Column 3, Table 4 and OLS Column
5, Table 4). In economic terms, the appointment of for-
eign board chairperson in a highly internationally inter-
locked boardroom reduces the impact of FIBCs on CG
quality of EMMNCs by approximate 4.33%. This implies
board interlocks out of the home country of EMMNCs
negatively affects the ability of FIBCs to impact on the
firm's CG quality at home. This result is consistent with
the busyness argument of interlocking directors and in
support of Masulis et al. (2012) results that other board
commitment out of the company may limit the ability of
directors to attend board meetings which reduces their
ability to assist the board chairman in enhancing the
CG quality of firms.
Finally, in the fourth (H4) hypothesis, we argue that
due to the presence of foreign CEOs in the daily gover-
nance of firms, they are less likely to be affected by the
busyness of directors due to interlocks with foreign boards.
Hence, we proposed a positive impact of foreign interlocks
on the association between FCEO and EMMNCs' gover-
nance quality. This prediction (see Columns 3 and 5 of
Table 4 for 3SLS and OLS estimations respectively) is
supported. Specifically, the appointment of a foreign CEO
in boardrooms with foreign interlocks improve the CG
quality of EMMNCs by approximately 2.27%. This suggests
international interlocks enhance the likelihood of FCEOs
to strengthen governance practices of EMMNCs through
the repeated game of governance isomorphism. Our results
is consistent to the findings of Chuah and Foong (2019);
Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) and suggest that,
despite the busyness of interlocked directors, their advisory
due to the experience in foreign boards enhances the ability
of foreign CEOs in weak governance enforcement environ-
ments to improve on the CG practices of firms.
4.3 | Robustness test
So far, we have shown that our results are robust to esti-
mation methods. Also, our 3SLS estimation evidence that
our findings are robust to endogeneity from simultaneity
and unobserved firm-specific factors. The 3SLS model is
plausibly more robust than its two-stage least squares
(2SLS) alternative, as it has additionally controls for
cross-correlations of residuals. Nonetheless, for confirma-
tory reasons, we re-examined our hypothesis using the
2SLS regression specification. The results are shown in
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5. As can be seen, the results
confirm our reported findings.
Furthermore, some scholars (e.g., Pham, Suchard, &
Zein, 2011; Roberts & Whited, 2013) argue that 3SLS does
not control for dynamic endogeneity. For example, past
values of the dependent variable can affect both current
values of the dependent and independent variable. For
instance, poor CG quality in the previous year can coerce
EMMNCs to appoint FIBCs and FCEOs to improve on
future CG quality. As a result, we conduct dynamic sys-
tem GMM estimation which has been shown (see for
example Wintoki et al., 2012) to control for dynamic
endogeneity. The results are presented in Columns 4 and
5 of Table 5. From the table, our results remain
unchanged suggesting robustness to dynamic
endogeneity.
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TABLE 5 Robustness to estimation methods
Variables
2SLS estimation Dynamic GMM estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Lag. CGQ — — 0.66*** 0.78***
— — (0.04) (0.02)
Foreign independent chairman (FIBC) 5.84*** 10.51*** 1.65*** 1.13***
(2.03) (2.33) (0.53) (0.37)
Foreign CEO (FCEO) 7.44*** 4.97** 1.27*** 0.48
(1.68) (1.99) (0.26) (0.36)
Gender diversity (GD) 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.13*** 0.11***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01)
Audit committee independence (ACI) 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Institutional shareholding (ISH) 0.01 0.00 0.05** 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
ROA 0.19*** 0.18*** −0.03 −0.03*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Tobin q (Q) 1.17*** 1.24*** 0.59*** 0.35***
(0.38) (0.37) (0.15) (0.07)
Sales growth (SG) −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Capital expenditure (CAP) 3.90 4.67 1.12** 1.39***
(3.41) (3.36) (0.43) (0.34)
CEO duality (DL) 15.78*** 15.87*** 4.45*** 2.07***
(4.65) (4.57) (1.57) (0.77)
Proportion of NEDs (NED) −0.04 −0.04 0.02 0.04***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Board international interlocks (BII) 0.74*** 1.39*** 0.09 0.14***
(0.24) (0.36) (0.07) (0.05)
FIBC*BII — −3.63*** — −0.81***
— (0.99) — (0.11)
FCEO*BII — 2.27** — 0.67***
— (1.01) — (0.13)
Constant 20.25*** 20.95*** 9.23** 4.50**
(6.21) (6.11) (3.94) (1.98)
N 480 480 400 400
R-squared 0.48 0.50 — —
AR (1) test (p-value) — — .01 .01
AR (2) test (p-value) — — .95 .97
Hansen test of over-identification (J) (p-value) — — .23 .94
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) — — .53 .63
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Also, CG scholarship argue (see e.g., Ntim
et al., 2012) that directors are more inclined to adopt gov-
ernance guidelines that have a direct impact on firm
returns than those that address stakeholder needs but
has no direct impact on firm performance. To ensure our
results are not sensitive to aggregation of these provisions
in our CG quality index, we split the index into two sub-
indices with 61 provisions that address accountability to
shareholders (SCGQ) and 14 provisions (SKCGQ) that
report on stakeholder governance. The shareholder
(SCGQ) and stakeholder (SKCGQ) sub-indices are depen-
dent variables in Columns 3–4 and 5–6 on Table 6 respec-
tively. As can be seen, our results remain robust across
both sub-indices.
Finally, as financial firms contribute towards a large
proportion of our sample, we examine whether our
results are robust to the exclusion of these firms. These
results are presented in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6. Still,
our results remain qualitatively similar and our conclu-
sions unchanged. This suggests that our results and con-
clusions are robustness to the inclusion of financial firms.
5 | CONCLUSION AND
LIMITATIONS
5.1 | Summary of findings
Motivated by the dearth of research that explores
whether foreign leadership of emerging market multina-
tionals impact on the quality of their CG practices, we
examine the effect of foreign chairpersons (FIBC) and
CEOs (FCEOs) on the CG quality of EMMNCs. Also, we
assess whether these associations are moderated by inter-
lock of EMMNCs boardrooms with foreign boardrooms.
Using Nigerian MNCs as exemplification of EMMNCs,
our findings are consistent with our main argument that
foreign leadership improve on the CG quality of firms in
weak governance enforcement environments. Specifi-
cally, FIBCs and FCEOs positively impact on the CG
quality in the home country of EMMNCs. Furthermore,
we also find that the effect of foreign chairpersons on the
governance quality of EMMNCs is negatively moderated
by international interlock of boardrooms. On the other
hand, interlocks with boardrooms out of the home coun-
try of EMMNCs positively and significantly moderate the
impact of non-native CEOs on EMMNCs' governance
quality. Drawing on these findings, we contribute to CG
literature across several dimensions.
First, we develop a conceptual framework (Figure 1)
that extend institutional isomorphism and repeated game
theories by uncovering how EMMNCs can be a source of
institutional evolution of CG practices in EMs through
foreignness of their leadership. Specifically, we show that
the motivation to reduce external dependencies in host
countries because of internationalization coerces
EMMNCs to adopt isomorphism strategies that ensure
legitimacy, reduce the liability of foreignness abroad in
addition to reducing institutional weaknesses of the
home country. The implementation of isomorphism strat-
egies by EMMNCs is achieved through the appointment
of foreigners to lead the firm and the board. These for-
eign leaders enhance CG quality in the home country of
EMMNCs through governance diffusion. We contend
that the repeated game of importation of good CG prac-
tices to EMMNCs through their leadership evolves to
more resilient governance institutions and becomes a
source of mimicking by local firms. The repeated game of
imitation of EMMNCs practices by peer firms in the
home country evolves to institutional change in CG prac-
tices in EMs that is capable of bypassing both weak
enforcement of formal governance guidelines and
unethical informal practices (e.g., corruption) which is
prevalent in EMs.
Second, we advance the growing literature on CG
mobility. We note that studies in this area have mostly
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Variables
2SLS estimation Dynamic GMM estimation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table presents re-estimation of all hypothesizes using alternative econometric methods (2SLS and Dynamic GMM). ***, **, *
denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Robust mean square standard errors (RMSE) are in parentheses. CGQ is an index of
firm compliance with the 75 provisions recommended by Nigeria SEC 2011 CG code. Arellano–Bond test statistic (AR1) and (AR2) follows
an asymptotic normal distribution, with null (H0): No autocorrelation of order v in the differenced errors. The residual values in first differ-
ences AR (1) can be correlated but no serial correlation should exist in the second difference AR (2). Hanson test of over-identification (J-Sta-
tistic) is a chi-squared distribution with (l − r) degrees of freedom with l indicating the number of moment conditions and r, the parameters
to be estimated; with a null (H0) = moment conditions are specified correctly (i.e., instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid). Diff-
in-Hansen tests of exogeneity has a null (H0) = instruments in the system equations are exogenous. Full variable definitions are available in
Table 2.
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concentrated on proportion of foreign directors
(e.g., Estélyi & Nisar, 2016; Miletkov et al., 2017) or for-
eign shareholders (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2011) and
bonding of firms through dual listing (e.g., Temouri
et al., 2016). We contribute to advance these studies, but
in contrast, we explore and provide novel evidence that
TABLE 6 Robustness to CG quality sub-indices
Variables
SCGQ SKCGQ Excl. Financial firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Foreign independent chairman (FIBC) 4.22** 8.83*** 12.97*** 22.35*** 4.44* 8.36***
(1.84) (2.10) (3.35) (3.82) (2.42) (2.66)
Foreign CEO (FCEO) 6.09*** 3.60** 14.10*** 6.19* 8.33*** 5.10**
(1.52) (1.79) (2.76) (3.27) (1.95) (2.22)
Gender diversity (GD) 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.44*** 0.48***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Audit committee independence (ACI) 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.29***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Institutional shareholding (ISH) 0.02 0.01 −0.06 −0.06 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
ROA 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.50*** 0.23***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
Tobin q (Q) 1.00*** 1.07*** 1.89*** 2.01*** 0.77 1.08***
(0.34) (0.33) (0.62) (0.61) (0.49) (0.38)
Sales growth (SG) −0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.03 −0.12*** −0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Capital expenditure (CAP) 3.19 4.10 5.89 9.22* 3.99 7.19**
(3.08) (3.01) (5.54) (5.48) (3.59) (3.36)
CEO duality (DL) 13.14*** 12.61*** 28.87*** 26.24*** 15.71*** 13.48***
(4.20) (4.10) (7.56) (7.45) (4.75) (4.46)
Proportion of NEDs (NED) −0.01 −0.01 −0.18** −0.18** 0.05 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Board international interlocks (BII) 0.72*** 1.39*** 0.85** 1.19** 0.51** 1.12***
(0.21) (0.32) (0.39) (0.59) (0.25) (0.38)
FIBC*BII — −3.59*** — −7.76*** — −3.70***
— (0.89) — (1.62) — (0.10)
FCEO*BII — 2.19** — 6.61*** — 2.56**
— (0.90) — (1.65) — (1.02)
Constant 21.56*** 23.16*** 15.49 19.35* 11.90* 11.82*
(5.61) (5.50) (10.18) (10.01) (6.95) (7.18)
N 480 480 480 480 294 294
R-squared 0.492 0.51 0.37 0.39 0.50 0.54
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table presents the impact of chairperson and CEO foreignness on CGQ sub-indices and and the moderating role of international
interlocks and excluding financial firms. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Robust mean square standard
errors (RMSE) are in parentheses. SCGQ and SKCGQ represent sub-indices measuring compliance with 61 shareholder-oriented and 14
stakeholder-oriented CG recommendations of the 2011 Nigeria SEC code of good practices in CG. Full variable definitions are available in
Table 2.
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foreign leadership of EMMNCs serve as channels of gover-
nance mobility. Specifically, we draw on human capital
and board leadership independence perspectives to
uncover how the international dimension of boards and
firm leadership leads to CG mobility across economic envi-
ronments. Specifically, we show that FCEOs and FIBCs
are important channels of governance mobility that posi-
tively impacts on EMMNCs' governance quality at home.
Third, we extend board interlock literature (Cai
et al., 2014; Chuah & Foong, 2019; Falato et al., 2014;
Field et al., 2013) by incorporating an international per-
spective of the latter and showing how this affects the
ability of agents of CG mobility to impact on MNCs gov-
ernance quality at home. Specifically, we evidence that,
while EMMNCs interlock with foreign boards may
advance the ability of FCEOs to export international CG
practices to EMs, it negatively affects the likelihood of
FIBCs to diffuse CG practices due to directors busyness
with boardroom commitments in other countries.
The findings of this study also has several managerial
relevance. Firstly, for EMMNCs, we offer them incentives
to appoint foreigners to lead the firm and boards. We show
that foreign individuals who occupy chairmanship and
CEO positions do not only improve legitimacy and reduce
the liability of foreignness in the host country but also pro-
mote governance diffusion practices which enhances the
quality of CG practices as recommended by regulators in
the home country. Also, we believe that improvement in
CG practices may assist EMMNCs to compete with interna-
tional rivals and may improve on their visibility as success
stories in the home country. This can reduce the uncer-
tainties and information asymmetry concerns that foreign
investors may have when investing in EMs. Therefore, this
may attract an inflow of capital from foreign shareholders
who are more likely to invest in firms with quality CG
practices. Finally, we highlight the importance of
EMMNCs and foreign leadership as mechanisms of institu-
tional evolution and change in EMs. Specifically, when
EMMNCs employ foreign leaders to manage their opera-
tions and board functioning, they bond with foreign CG
practices that can overcome weak enforcement and nega-
tive informal practices (e.g., corruption) which may evolve
to resilient governance institutions and bring about institu-
tional change in EMs through mimicking by local firms.
5.2 | Limitations and future research
implications
Our research may suffer from certain caveats that should
be examined by future research. First, while the theoreti-
cal and practical insights of this study may apply to other
EMs and assist in unravelling how EMMNCs can bring
institutional evolution and change in their countries of
origin, it may be interesting to explore the extent to
which the findings are generalizable across contexts. Spe-
cifically, because we examine MNCs with origin from a
single emerging economy, this may affect cross-country
generalization of results. Furthermore, our research pro-
vides insights on foreign leadership as channels through
which EMMNCs can improve their governance practices
at home. Nevertheless, these governance mobility agents
and those reported so far in existing literature may not be
the only international governance mechanisms that firms
in EMs can use to bring institutional change. For exam-
ple, native directors and managers in EMs who have
studied or worked in foreign countries (especially in
countries with robust corporate systems) can serve as
bonding mechanisms to international CG practices.
Hence, returnee directors may be additional channels of
institutional change as they can use their knowledge
from foreign countries to improve on EMMNCs and non-
MNC CG practices. Hence, we suggest future research to
examine other channels of governance mobility and insti-
tutional evolution in EMs beyond those discussed in the
literature.
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